12/02/07

Palestinians from all over the world, but especially in Gaza , received the news of the Mecca agreement with a great deal of optimism and enthusiasm. Politicians and analysts are a little more cautiously optimistic.

The optimism stems from the fact that, first, this agreement has already accomplished a ceasefire between the competing groups in Gaza and put an end to the bloodiest ever internal confrontations between Palestinian factions.

Second, it marked another small yet significant evolution in the political position of Hamas in the direction of the PLO's political platform and international legality. This, if looked at as part of a series of developments, creates hope of a possible further narrowing of the political differences between the different groups, particularly Fateh and Hamas.

Third, the agreement prepares the ground for the establishment of a national unity government that the public believes will have a better chance of success in fulfilling its obligations to the population, especially with regards to social services, after the failure of the current government in this aspect.

But there is caution because two other areas of dispute that were specified in the agenda at Mecca are still unresolved and threaten a possible renewal of tensions and violence.

One is the reform of the PLO, where Hamas demands changes in both the political platform and the organization's composition. That is a sensitive and dangerous issue because the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause is embodied by the PLO. If the PLO includes groups like an unchanged Hamas this might negatively affect the international recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Second is what the parties at Mecca referred to as "political partnership". This is essentially code for the redistribution of significant positions--ambassadors, governors and top civil servants--between Fateh and Hamas after having been mostly filled by Fateh cadres.

This is not an easy demand. It contradicts the basic requirements of good governance, since these positions should be filled on the basis of professional competence rather than factional affiliation. The main lesson we drew during the process of reforms is that appointments on the basis of factional loyalty in the early stage of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority were responsible for the weakness of the performance of the PA and a cause of corruption.

Outside these internal issues, Palestinians are also hoping for a positive response from the international community. So far there have been mixed reactions. Although the official Quartet response reiterated the well-known international conditions for dealing with the Palestinian government, it is also apparent that there are differences within the Quartet. The Europeans seem relatively positive, while the Americans have chosen not to take an official position yet, in itself more constructive than a negative response.

It can be hoped that the international community will focus on the positives. While it is true that the Mecca agreement for a future government spoke of "respect" for past agreements and international legality, rather than adherence, and that this might not go far enough for some parties, it is a step forward and the maximum possible compromise at this stage.

The Saudis are working on obtaining a working definition of "respect" from Hamas. This might be helpful in marketing the agreement.

What the Mecca agreement has achieved is to put President Mahmoud Abbas in a much stronger position not only internally but also as far as the summit on February 19 between him, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is concerned. The international community, and especially the US , needs to build on this achievement in a way that can consolidate and strengthen the political position of Abbas internally.

The international community should also understand that the only fruitful way to interfere in internal Palestinian politics is by initiating a political process of the kind that will determine the final outcome from the start. This will assure Palestinians that such a process is the safest and shortest way to achieve their legitimate objectives of statehood and ending the occupation.

If the international community misses this opportunity it will increase chances of further rounds of confrontations and more frustration and radicalization among Palestinians as well as Israelis.

*Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications. He is the former Palestinian Authority minister of planning, and has been a political analyst and media contact for many years.